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Request Delay-Based Pricing for Proactive Caching: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Author(s) -
Wei Huang,
Wei Chen,
H. Vincent Poor
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
ieee transactions on wireless communications
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.01
H-Index - 223
eISSN - 1558-2248
pISSN - 1536-1276
DOI - 10.1109/twc.2019.2904261
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , computer science , profit maximization , payment , profit (economics) , computer network , base station , nash equilibrium , backward induction , game theory , mathematical optimization , incentive , bandwidth (computing) , microeconomics , economics , mathematics , world wide web
Proactively pushing content to users has emerged as a promising approach to improve the spectrum usage in off-peak times for fifth-generation mobile networks. However, owing to the uncertainty of future user demands, base stations (BSs) may not receive payments for the pushed files. To motivate content pushing, providing economic incentives to BSs becomes essential. Based on request delay informat...

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