Constrained VCG Auction With Multi-Level Channel Valuations for Spatial Spectrum Reuse in Non-Symmetric Networks

Spatial spectrum reuse enables better utilization of limited spectral resources to achieve higher system throughput. However, improving the system throughput or spectrum efficiency does not necessarily translate to the satisfaction of more secondary users (SUs) according to their demands. To improve user satisfaction, user characteristics involving the supply and demand relationship need to be considered and thus enable heterogeneous channel valuations in spatial spectrum reuse. In this paper, we design a channel transaction mechanism for non-symmetric networks and maximize user satisfaction in consideration of multi-level flexible channel valuations of the SUs. Specifically, we introduce a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction, in which the participants are limited to the allowable user crowds. To facilitate the bid formation, we transform the constrained VCG auction to a step-by-step decision process. Meanwhile, the SUs in a coalition play a coalitional game with transferable utilities. We use the Shapley value to realize fair payoff distribution among the SUs in a coalition. Furthermore, we approach the optimal channel allocation via finding the longest path in a directed acyclic graph, a greedy algorithm, and batch allocation. In our simulation, we compare the low-complexity algorithms and demonstrate the efficiency of the channel transaction mechanism.