Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems | Zendy

André Teixeira | Zendy; Iman Shames | Zendy; Henrik Sandberg | Zendy; Karl Henrik Johansson | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems

Author(s) -

André Teixeira,

Iman Shames,

Henrik Sandberg,

Karl Henrik Johansson

Publication year - 2012

Publication title -

kth publication database diva (kth royal institute of technology)

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Conference proceedings

DOI - 10.1109/allerton.2012.6483441

Subject(s) - computer science , invariant (physics) , system dynamics , linear system , lti system theory , control system , computer security , mathematics , engineering , artificial intelligence , mathematical analysis , electrical engineering , mathematical physics

In this paper the problem of revealing stealthy data-injection attacks on control systems is addressed. In particular we consider the scenario where the attacker performs zero-dynamics attacks on the system. First, we characterize and analyze the stealthiness properties of these attacks for linear time-invariant systems. Then we tackle the problem of detecting such attacks by modifying the system's structure. Our results provide necessary and sufficient conditions that the modifications should satisfy in order to detect the zero-dynamics attacks. The results and proposed detection methods are illustrated through numerical examples.

QC 20121114

HYCON

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research