Network Capacity Enhancement in HetNets Using Incentivized Offloading Mechanism
Author(s) -
Bokamoso Basutli,
Joseph M. Chuma,
Sangarapillai Lambotharan
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
ieee access
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587
H-Index - 127
ISSN - 2169-3536
DOI - 10.1109/access.2018.2856479
Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation
This paper investigates distributed algorithms for joint power allocation and user association in heterogeneous networks. We propose auction-based algorithms for offloading macrocell users (MUs ) from the macrocell base station to privately owned small-cell access points (SCAs). We first propose a simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA) for allocating MUs to SCAs. Taking into account the overheads incurred by SCAs during valuation in the SMRA, further improvements are proposed using techniques known as sub-optimal altered SMRA, the combinatorial auction with item bidding (CAIB), and its variations; the sequential CAIB and the repetitive CAIB. The proof for existence of the Walrasian equilibrium is demonstrated through establishing that the valuation function used by the SCAs is a gross substitute. Finally, we show that truthful bidding is individual rational for all of our proposed algorithms.
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