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A Blockchain Based Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Distributed P2P Applications
Author(s) -
Yunhua He,
Hong Li,
Xiuzhen Cheng,
Yan Liu,
Chao Yang,
Limin Sun
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
ieee access
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587
H-Index - 127
ISSN - 2169-3536
DOI - 10.1109/access.2018.2821705
Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation
In distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) applications, peers self-organize and cooperate to effectively complete certain tasks such as forwarding files, delivering messages, or uploading data. Nevertheless, users are selfish in nature and they may refuse to cooperate due to their concerns on energy and bandwidth consumption. Thus each user should receive a satisfying reward to compensate its resource consumption for cooperation. However, suitable incentive mechanisms that can meet the diverse requirements of users in dynamic and distributed P2P environments are still missing. On the other hand, we observe that Blockchain is a decentralized secure digital ledger of economic transactions that can be programmed to record not just financial transactions and Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies get more and more market capitalization. Therefore in this paper, we propose a Blockchain based truthful incentive mechanism for distributed P2P applications that applies a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin to incentivize users for cooperation. In this mechanism, users who help with a successful delivery get rewarded. As users and miners in the Blockchain P2P system may exhibit selfish actions or collude with each other, we propose a secure validation method and a pricing strategy, and integrate them into our incentive mechanism. Through a game theoretical analysis and evaluation study, we demonstrate the effectiveness and security strength of our proposed incentive mechanism.

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