A Stackelberg-Game Approach for Disaster-Recovery Communications Utilizing Cooperative D2D | Zendy

Zheng Chu | Zendy; Tuan Anh Le | Zendy; Huan X. Nguyen | Zendy; Arumugam Nallanathan | Zendy; Mehmet Karamanoglu | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

A Stackelberg-Game Approach for Disaster-Recovery Communications Utilizing Cooperative D2D

Author(s) -

Zheng Chu,

Tuan Anh Le,

Huan X. Nguyen,

Arumugam Nallanathan,

Mehmet Karamanoglu

Publication year - 2017

Publication title -

ieee access

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587

H-Index - 127

ISSN - 2169-3536

DOI - 10.1109/access.2017.2766921

Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation

In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery communications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications. Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area, while the other is in a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer via an energy harvesting relay. In the healthy area, the cellular base station (BS) shares the spectrum with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed-form solutions. The results help providing a sustainable framework for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between energy trading, interference compromise, and payment incentives in establishing communications during the recovery process.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research