z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Planning and Representing Intentional Action
Author(s) -
Bernhard Hommel
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
the scientific world journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.453
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 2356-6140
pISSN - 1537-744X
DOI - 10.1100/tsw.2003.46
Subject(s) - action (physics) , affordance , perception , cognitive psychology , cognition , psychology , control (management) , representation (politics) , balance (ability) , computer science , neuroscience , artificial intelligence , political science , physics , quantum mechanics , politics , law
This paper reviews recent approaches to human action planning and the cognitive representation of intentional actions. Evidence suggests that action planning takes place in terms of anticipated features of the intended goal, that is, in terms of action effects. These effects are acquired from early infancy on by registering contingencies between movements and perceptual movement outcomes. Co-occurrence of movements and effects leads to the creation of bidirectional associations between the underlying internal codes, thus establishing distributed perception-action networks subserving both perceiving external events and intentionally producing them. Action plans determine only the general, goal-relevant features of intended actions, while the fine-tuning is left to on-line sensory-motor processing. Action plans emerge from competition for action control between several factors: overlearned habits, perceptual events, and emotional influences, among others. Accordingly, action control represents a balance between personal intentions and wishes on the one hand and environmental affordances and demands on the other.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom