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The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for ‘no-report’ paradigms
Author(s) -
Michael Pitts,
Lydia A. Lutsyshyna,
Steven A. Hillyard
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
philosophical transactions of the royal society b biological sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1471-2970
pISSN - 0962-8436
DOI - 10.1098/rstb.2017.0348
Subject(s) - consciousness , cognitive science , variety (cybernetics) , perception , cognition , psychology , taxonomy (biology) , perspective (graphical) , field (mathematics) , epistemology , cognitive psychology , computer science , artificial intelligence , neuroscience , philosophy , botany , mathematics , pure mathematics , biology
Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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