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Game-theoretical models have been highly influential in behavioural ecology. However, these models generally assume that animals choose their action before observing the behaviour of their opponents while, in many natural situations, individuals in fact continuously react to the actions of others. A negotiation process then takes place and this may fundamentally influence the individual attitudes and the tendency to cooperate. Here, I use the classical model system of vigilance behaviour to demonstrate the consequences of such behavioural negotiation among selfish individuals, by predicting patterns of vigilance in a pair of animals foraging under threat of predation. I show that the game played by the animals and the resulting vigilance strategies take radically different forms, according to the way predation risk is shared in the pair. In particular, if predators choose their target at random, the prey respond by displaying moderate vigilance and taking turns scanning. By contrast, if the individual that takes flight later in an attack endures a higher risk of being targeted, vigilance increases and there is always at least one sentinel in the pair. Finally, when lagging behind its companion in fleeing from an attacker becomes extremely risky, vigilance decreases again and the animals scan simultaneously.

Negotiation may lead selfish individuals to cooperate: the example of the collective vigilance game