The value of reputation
Author(s) -
Thomas Pfeiffer,
Lily Tran,
Coco Krumme,
David G. Rand
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
journal of the royal society interface
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.655
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1742-5689
pISSN - 1742-5662
DOI - 10.1098/rsif.2012.0332
Subject(s) - reputation , dilemma , stochastic game , value (mathematics) , microeconomics , set (abstract data type) , repeated game , business , economics , game theory , marketing , computer science , law , political science , mathematics , programming language , geometry , machine learning
Reputation plays a central role in human societies. Empirical and theoretical work indicates that a good reputation is valuable in that it increases one's expected payoff in the future. Here, we explore a game that couples a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), in which participants can earn and can benefit from a good reputation, with a market in which reputation can be bought and sold. This game allows us to investigate how the trading of reputation affects cooperation in the PD, and how participants assess the value of having a good reputation. We find that depending on how the game is set up, trading can have a positive or a negative effect on the overall frequency of cooperation. Moreover, we show that the more valuable a good reputation is in the PD, the higher the price at which it is traded in the market. Our findings have important implications for the use of reputation systems in practice.
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