Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone*
Author(s) -
Michael Bradley,
Mitu Gulati
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
european finance review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.933
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1573-692X
pISSN - 1382-6662
DOI - 10.1093/rof/rft050
Subject(s) - restructuring , collective action , bond , sovereignty , creditor , sovereign debt , debt , economics , business , investment (military) , action (physics) , monetary economics , financial system , international economics , political science , finance , law , physics , quantum mechanics , politics
One of the primary policy initiatives instituted in response to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is a requirement that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1 2013 include provisions referred to as Collective Action Clauses or CACs. These CACs allow for a super-majority of creditors to impose restructuring terms on minority holdouts. This article assesses the likely effect of this proposal on the borrowing costs of sovereign debtors. Contrary to much of the literature, we find that the presence of CACs leads to a lower cost of capital, especially for below-investment grade bonds.
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