Predatory Short Selling*
Author(s) -
Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Martin Oehmke
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
european finance review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.933
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1573-692X
pISSN - 1382-6662
DOI - 10.1093/rof/rft043
Subject(s) - leverage (statistics) , creditor , business , financial institution , stock (firearms) , monetary economics , institution , economics , financial economics , finance , debt , geography , archaeology , machine learning , computer science , political science , law
Financial institutions may be vulnerable to predatory short selling. When the stock of a financial institution is shorted aggressively, leverage constraints imposed\udby short-term creditors can force the institution to liquidate long-term investments at fire sale prices. For financial institutions that are sufficiently close to their leverage constraints, predatory short selling equilibria co-exist with no-liquidation equilibria (the vulnerability region), or may even be the unique equilibrium outcome (the doomed region). Increased\udcoordination among short sellers expands the doomed region, where liquidation is the\udunique equilibrium. Our model provides a potential justification for temporary restrictions\udof short selling for vulnerable institutions and can be used to assess recent empirical\udevidence on short-sale bans
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom