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Out-of-Court Restructuring versus Formal Bankruptcy in a Non-Interventionist Bankruptcy Setting*
Author(s) -
Philipp Jostarndt,
Zacharias Sautner
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
european finance review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.933
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1573-692X
pISSN - 1382-6662
DOI - 10.1093/rof/rfp022
Subject(s) - bankruptcy , restructuring , collateralized debt obligation , leverage (statistics) , debt , debt restructuring , business , sample (material) , financial system , monetary economics , stock (firearms) , finance , accounting , economics , collateral , law , sovereign debt , mechanical engineering , chemistry , chromatography , sovereignty , machine learning , politics , computer science , political science , engineering
We investigate debt restructurings in Germany for a sample of 116 financially distressed companies. About half of the firms succeed in restructuring their debt in a workout while the others file for bankruptcy. Our evidence suggests that firms which have higher leverage, owe more debt to banks, and exhibit higher going concern values are more likely to conduct a workout. Bankruptcy is more likely for firms with deficient lender coordination and a high fraction of collateralized debt. An analysis of stock returns suggests that the market uses similar information to predict workouts. 84% of the bankrupt firms were ultimately liquidated. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

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