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Equilibrium Asset Pricing and Portfolio Choice Under Asymmetric Information
Author(s) -
Bruno Biais,
Peter Bossaerts,
Chester S. Spatt
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
review of financial studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 12.8
H-Index - 190
eISSN - 1465-7368
pISSN - 0893-9454
DOI - 10.1093/rfs/hhp113
Subject(s) - portfolio , information asymmetry , economics , capital asset pricing model , asset (computer security) , post modern portfolio theory , replicating portfolio , microeconomics , portfolio optimization , econometrics , momentum (technical analysis) , curse , financial economics , computer science , computer security , sociology , anthropology
We analyze theoretically and empirically the implications of information asymmetry for equilibrium asset pricing and portfolio choice. In our partially revealing dynamic rational expectations equilibrium, portfolio separation fails, and indexing is not optimal. We show how uninformed investors should structure their portfolios, using the information contained in prices to cope with winner's curse problems. We implement empirically this price- contingent portfolio strategy. Consistent with our theory, the strategy outperforms economically and statistically the index. While momentum can arise in the model, in the data, the momentum strategy does not outperform the price-contingent strategy, as predicted by the theory. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

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