Optimal Voting Rules | Zendy

Alex Gershkov | Zendy; Benny Moldovanu | Zendy; Xianwen Shi | Zendy

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Optimal Voting Rules

Author(s) -

Alex Gershkov,

Benny Moldovanu,

Xianwen Shi

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

the review of economic studies

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 15.641

H-Index - 141

eISSN - 1467-937X

pISSN - 0034-6527

DOI - 10.1093/restud/rdw044

Subject(s) - voting , outcome (game theory) , incentive , ex ante , economics , class (philosophy) , microeconomics , replicate , welfare , incentive compatibility , mathematical economics , social choice theory , legislature , computer science , majority rule , econometrics , mathematics , artificial intelligence , law , statistics , political science , politics , market economy , macroeconomics

We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme, due to Bowen (1943), and used in many legislatures and committees. The modiÖcation uses a áexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on the elegant characterization of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked preferences by Moulin (1980) and, subsequently, for single-crossing preferences by Saporiti (2009)

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