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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
Author(s) -
Yuichi Yamamoto
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
the review of economic studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 15.641
H-Index - 141
eISSN - 1467-937X
pISSN - 0034-6527
DOI - 10.1093/restud/rdt029
Subject(s) - unobservable , repeated game , stochastic game , mathematical economics , economics , equilibrium selection , class (philosophy) , state (computer science) , fictitious play , adversary , microeconomics , computer science , game theory , econometrics , artificial intelligence , computer security , algorithm

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