Rational Groupthink
Author(s) -
Matan Harel,
Elchanan Mossel,
Philipp Strack,
Omer Tamuz
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
the quarterly journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 34.573
H-Index - 259
eISSN - 1531-4650
pISSN - 0033-5533
DOI - 10.1093/qje/qjaa026
Subject(s) - private information retrieval , action (physics) , signal (programming language) , group (periodic table) , psychology , rational number , computer science , social psychology , mathematical economics , artificial intelligence , economics , mathematics , pure mathematics , computer security , physics , quantum mechanics , programming language
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each others’ actions. With normal signals, a group of any size learns more slowly than just four agents who directly observe each others’ private signals in each period. Similar results apply to general signal structures. We identify rational groupthink—in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long periods of time—as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.
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