Fighting COVID-19 in the United States with Federalism and Other Constitutional and Statutory Authority
Author(s) -
Beverly A. Cigler
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
publius the journal of federalism
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.926
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1747-7107
pISSN - 0048-5950
DOI - 10.1093/publius/pjab021
Subject(s) - statutory law , federalism , constitution , political science , public administration , preparedness , pandemic , sovereignty , separation of powers , covid-19 , unitary state , democracy , democratic legitimacy , decentralization , law , politics , medicine , infectious disease (medical specialty) , disease , pathology
The COVID-19 pandemic challenges a workable American federalism. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reserves plenary responsibilities to states for promoting health and well-being; but states and their local governments suffer from a significant lack of resources and interjurisdictional competition during major emergencies. In this article, I argue that a president has significant constitutional and statutory authority for pandemic preparedness and, by law, is responsible for leading a coordinated national response necessary to a pandemic. The article outlines the constitutional and statutory authorities available to President Trump and assesses how he used those powers to address the pandemic. It is argued that early, decisive national coordinative systems for containing and mitigating the virus; testing, tracing, contacting, and isolation protocols; data collection standardization; procurement and distribution of supplies; and planning vaccine eligibility and distribution could have reduced the state and local government disadvantages early in the pandemic, saving lives and boosting the economy.
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