Rediscovering Heschel: Theocentrism, Secularism, and Porous Thinking

While Abraham Joshua Heschel remains a celebrated figure in modern Judaism, one cannot help but notice beneath the veneer of approbation is a consistent lack of appreciation for his thought. In this essay, I argue that Heschel’s rigor and ingenuity has been largely overlooked because interpreters apply categories to his thought which are not only heterogeneous to it, but also whose foundation Heschel’s thought actively tries to subvert. Rather than elucidating a particular dimension of Heschel’s thought which I then critique—an endeavor I believe that scholars have been too eager to undertake—I attempt to clear away some of the ground of past Heschel scholarship which I believe has obscured his work more than elucidated it. In short, this piece is more exegetical than critical. Of course critical assessment is important, but before we can critique it is essential that we properly grasp our subject matter. I argue that certain basic assumptions about the nature of what it means to philosophize about religion have obscured or obstructed access to Heschel’s work. Heschel’s thought proceeds from a standpoint which is not only foreign to the sensibilities of modernity, namely skepticism and detachment, but he also actively seeks to convert them into awe and wonder. However, Heschel’s critics, as I will show, are unwilling or unable to accept the terms in which Heschel presents his thought, and instead apply categories that are not only heterogeneous to his thought but also and more pointedly, antithetical to it. To begin to correct this situation, I will offer an account of Heschel’s theocentric philososphical theology in order to demonstrate a prominent strategy in Heschel interpretation, namely, viewing his thought as evidence of religiously committed thinking as opposed to disinterested philosophical thought. Next, drawing upon Charles