Understanding Tacit Security Regimes
Author(s) -
Asaf Siniver,
Scott Lucas
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of global security studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2057-3170
DOI - 10.1093/jogss/ogz034
Subject(s) - turkish , international security , political science , security studies , field (mathematics) , mechanism (biology) , tacit knowledge , security interest , economic system , epistemology , public administration , law , economics , mathematics , philosophy , linguistics , pure mathematics
More than three decades after the concept of international regimes was introduced, the study of why and how states may choose to cooperate, particularly around security, remains contested. While the field has evolved considerably over that time, there remain significant puzzles in the literature concerning the emergence of different types of security regimes. We aim to address these issues by developing the concept of a tacit security regime (TSR) literature. We define a TSR as an interest-based, limited, and informal mechanism of cooperation between states for the purpose of deconflicting their respective interests over a specific security issue. We illustrate the usefulness of our concept in the two contemporary cases of Russian-Israeli and Russian-Turkish security cooperation over the Syrian crisis (2015–2018).
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