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Voluntary Consent: Why a Value-Neutral Concept Won't Work
Author(s) -
Albert I. Wertheimer
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the journal of medicine and philosophy a forum for bioethics and philosophy of medicine
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.328
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1744-5019
pISSN - 0360-5310
DOI - 10.1093/jmp/jhs016
Subject(s) - voluntariness , value (mathematics) , informed consent , work (physics) , subject (documents) , psychology , social psychology , epistemology , law , political science , philosophy , medicine , computer science , alternative medicine , engineering , mechanical engineering , pathology , machine learning , library science
Some maintain that voluntariness is a value-neutral concept. On that view, someone acts involuntarily if subject to a controlling influence or has no acceptable alternatives. I argue that a value-neutral conception of voluntariness cannot explain when and why consent is invalid and that we need a moralized account of voluntariness. On that view, most concerns about the voluntariness of consent to participate in research are not well founded.

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