Paying Americans to take the vaccine—would it help or backfire?
Author(s) -
Christopher T. Robertson,
Daniel Scheitrum,
Aleks Schaefer,
Trey Malone,
Brandon R. McFadden,
Kent D. Messer,
Paul J. Ferraro
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
journal of law and the biosciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.904
H-Index - 18
ISSN - 2053-9711
DOI - 10.1093/jlb/lsab027
Subject(s) - incentive , cash , vaccination , affect (linguistics) , population , demographic economics , baseline (sea) , business , public economics , economics , finance , medicine , environmental health , psychology , political science , microeconomics , virology , communication , law
This research investigates the extent to which financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against coronavirus disease of 2019. We performed a randomized survey experiment with a representative sample of 1000 American adults in December 2020. Respondents were asked whether they would opt for vaccination under one of three incentive conditions ($1000, $1500, or $2000 financial incentive) or a no-incentive condition. We find that—without coupled financial incentives—only 58 per cent of survey respondents would elect for vaccination. A coupled financial incentive yields an 8-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake relative to this baseline. The size of the cash transfer does not dramatically affect uptake rates. However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For Black and Latino Americans especially, very large financial incentives may be counter-productive.
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