The devil in the tiers1
Author(s) -
Robin Feldman
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of law and the biosciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.904
H-Index - 18
ISSN - 2053-9711
DOI - 10.1093/jlb/lsaa081
Subject(s) - incentive , formulary , counterintuitive , subsidy , business , drug prices , public economics , prescription drug , medical prescription , economics , actuarial science , law and economics , internet privacy , medicine , microeconomics , computer science , pharmacology , market economy , philosophy , epistemology
Prescription drug spending in the USA has soared, fueled by rising drug prices. A critical mechanism for restraining drug prices is the formulary tiering system. Although tiering should reflect the cost of a drug—and reward patients who choose less-expensive drugs—something is seriously amiss. Using Medicare claims data from roughly one million patients between 2010 and 2017, this article finds troubling amounts of distorted tiering and wasted cost. Increasingly, generics are shifted to more expensive—and therefore less accessible—tiers. The percentage of generics on the least-expensive tier drops from 73% to 28%; the percentage of drugs on inappropriate tiers rises from 47% to 74%. Considering only costs paid by patients and the federal Low-Income Subsidy Program, tier misplacement cumulatively costs society $13.25 billion over the time period. An unruly problem demands a disruptive solution. This article advances the counterintuitive regulatory reform that tiering should be based on a drug’s list price. Yes, list price—that roundly dismissed figure—should become the touchstone. This would deter incentive-distorting rebate schemes while recognizing that many people already pay list price. It is a remarkably streamlined approach for cutting through a wide swath of perverse incentives and manipulations.
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