Is ‘viability’ viable? Abortion, conceptual confusion and the law in England and Wales and the United States
Author(s) -
Elizabeth Chloe Romanis
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of law and the biosciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.904
H-Index - 18
ISSN - 2053-9711
DOI - 10.1093/jlb/lsaa059
Subject(s) - abortion , meaning (existential) , confusion , law , new england , abortion law , criminal law , personhood , political science , sociology , family planning , psychology , pregnancy , biology , epistemology , philosophy , demography , politics , population , psychoanalysis , research methodology , genetics
In this paper, I explore how viability, meaning the ability of the fetus to survive post-delivery, features in the law regulating abortion provision in England and Wales and the USA. I demonstrate that viability is formalized differently in the criminal law in England and Wales and the USA, such that it is quantified and defined differently. I consider how the law might be applied to the examples of artificial womb technology and anencephalic fetuses. I conclude that there is incoherence in the meaning of viability and argue that it is thus a conceptually illegitimate basis on which to ground abortion regulation. This is both because of the fluidity of the concept and because how it has been thus far understood in the law is unsupported by medical realities. Furthermore, it has the effect of heavily diluting pregnant people’s rights with overly moralistic limitations on access to healthcare.
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