Regulation as Delegation | Zendy

Oren BarGill | Zendy; Cass R. Sunstein | Zendy

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Regulation as Delegation

Author(s) -

Oren BarGill,

Cass R. Sunstein

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

the journal of legal analysis

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.797

H-Index - 11

eISSN - 2161-7201

pISSN - 1946-5319

DOI - 10.1093/jla/lav005

Subject(s) - delegation , principal (computer security) , government (linguistics) , principal–agent problem , consumption (sociology) , business , economics , public economics , finance , computer security , computer science , management , corporate governance , sociology , linguistics , philosophy , social science

In diverse areas – from retirement savings, to fuel economy, to prescription drugs, to consumer credit, to food and beverage consumption – government makes personal decisions for us or helps us make what it sees as better decisions. In other words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory (BPAT), a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Shifting from personal decisions to public goods problems, we introduce the idea of reverse delegation, with the government as principal and the individuals as agents.

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