Notice Failure and Notice Externalities
Author(s) -
Peter S. Menell,
Michael J. Meurer
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the journal of legal analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.797
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 2161-7201
pISSN - 1946-5319
DOI - 10.1093/jla/las019
Subject(s) - notice , intellectual property , externality , incentive , scope (computer science) , law and economics , market failure , business , principal (computer security) , economics , public economics , market economy , law , microeconomics , political science , computer security , programming language , computer science
The emergence of intangible resources, such as intellectual property illuminates a previously unrecognized market failure: what we call a “notice externality.” The incentives of those claiming intellectual property diverge from the social interest. Inventors and creators can sometimes benefit from obfuscating the scope of rights and keeping others in the dark about their intellectual property. This article explores the principal causes of notice failure in the development of intangible resources and offers a multifaceted framework for diagnosing, preventing, internalizing, and ameliorating its adverse effects.
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