Law Enforcement and Bargaining over Illicit Drug Prices: Structural Evidence from a Gang’s Ledger | Zendy

Kaiwen Leong | Zendy; Huailu Li | Zendy; Marc Rysman | Zendy; Christoph Walsh | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Law Enforcement and Bargaining over Illicit Drug Prices: Structural Evidence from a Gang’s Ledger

Author(s) -

Kaiwen Leong,

Huailu Li,

Marc Rysman,

Christoph Walsh

Publication year - 2022

Publication title -

journal of the european economic association

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792

H-Index - 93

eISSN - 1542-4774

pISSN - 1542-4766

DOI - 10.1093/jeea/jvac003

Subject(s) - bargaining power , law enforcement , enforcement , economics , addiction , power (physics) , business , microeconomics , law , political science , medicine , psychiatry , physics , quantum mechanics

We estimate a structural model of bargaining between a branch of a large transnational gang and pushers using data from detailed records kept by the gang. The model allows for the gang’s relative bargaining power to differ for pushers with different characteristics, such as those with addictions or borrowing problems. Exploiting supply shocks in our data, we use the estimated model to study the effectiveness of various enforcement strategies. We find that targeting pushers is more effective at reducing quantities sold compared to targeting the gang’s upstream supply chain.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research