Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel
Author(s) -
Michael S. Barr,
Geoffrey P. Miller
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
european journal of international law
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.607
H-Index - 59
eISSN - 1464-3596
pISSN - 0938-5428
DOI - 10.1093/ejil/chi167
Subject(s) - legitimacy , accountability , international law , democratic deficit , law , soft law , political science , administrative law , democracy , economics , public administration , law and economics , politics
International law-making by sub-national actors and regulatory networks of bureaucrats has come under attack as lacking in accountability and legitimacy. Global administrative law is emerging as an approach to understanding what international organizations and national governments do, or ought to do, to respond to the perceived democracy deficit in international law-making. This article examines the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a club of central bankers who meet to develop international banking capital standards and to develop supervisory guidance. The Basel Committee embodies many of the attributes that critics of international law-making lament. A closer examination, however, reveals a structure of global administrative law inherent in the Basel process that could be a model for international law-making with greater accountability and legitimacy.
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