The Design of International Agreements
Author(s) -
Andrew T. Guzmán
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
european journal of international law
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.607
H-Index - 59
eISSN - 1464-3596
pISSN - 0938-5428
DOI - 10.1093/ejil/chi134
Subject(s) - credibility , sanctions , treaty , law and economics , payment , independence (probability theory) , compliance (psychology) , business , law , economics , political science , finance , psychology , social psychology , statistics , mathematics
T HE D ESIGN OF I NTERNATIONAL A GREEMENTS Andrew T. Guzman * This Draft: November 10, 2004 Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. I owe thanks to Stephen Choi, Jeff Atik, Allen Ferrell, Ryan Goodman, Oona Hathaway, Larry Helfer, Louis Kaplow, Kal Raustiala, Steven Shavell, Beth Simmons, Joel Trachtman, Fred Tung, and participants at faculty seminars at Harvard Law School, Loyola Law School, Temple University’s James E. Beasley School of Law, the University of Toronto School of Law, UCLA Law School, and Yale Law School, for helpful comments and discussions. Special thanks to Daniel Frederick and Nicholas James. Jennie Wang and Rachel Anderson provided excellent research assistance.
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