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Revising the draft articles on state responsibility
Author(s) -
James Crawford
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
european journal of international law
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.607
H-Index - 59
eISSN - 1464-3596
pISSN - 0938-5428
DOI - 10.1093/ejil/10.2.435
Subject(s) - state responsibility , state (computer science) , law , damages , balance (ability) , law and economics , attribution , compensation (psychology) , international law , flexibility (engineering) , set (abstract data type) , causation , sociology , political science , computer science , economics , psychology , social psychology , management , algorithm , neuroscience , programming language
This article reviews some major issues involved in revising Part 1 of the 1980 draft on state responsibility and responds to comments made in this symposium. In the author's view: (a) there is no single principle of fault as a basis for state responsibility in international law, nor is the possibility of no-fault responsibility a priori excluded. The debate is thus a false one. Retaining Articles 1 and 3 recognizes that the particular standard of responsibility is set by the primary rules; (b) criticisms that the articles on attribution of conduct to the state embody a 'very traditional' Western concept of the state fail to take into account the flexibility of the rules; the distinction between obligations of conduct and of result lacks consequences within the framework of the secondary rules, and is of doubtful value; (d) the idea of international crimes as expressed is unnecessary and potentially destructive. But the idea that some obligations are owed to the international community as a whole and that grave breaches thereof may attract special consequences, is important. The problem is to find an acceptable formulation; (e) two different kinds of circumstances precluding wrongfulness are dealt with in Chapter V: some (e.g. self-defence) preclude wrongfulness; others (e.g. distress, necessity) preclude responsibility. This distinction should be more clearly made; (f) the balance between restitution and compensation needs further thought, but it is not clear that the Draft Articles as presently formulated are defective.

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