Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates | Zendy

Cesi Cruz | Zendy; Philip Keefer | Zendy; Julien Labonne | Zendy

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Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates

Author(s) -

Cesi Cruz,

Philip Keefer,

Julien Labonne

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

the economic journal

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.683

H-Index - 160

eISSN - 1468-0297

pISSN - 0013-0133

DOI - 10.1093/ej/ueaa112

Subject(s) - leverage (statistics) , accountability , work (physics) , government (linguistics) , psychological intervention , business , public relations , political science , political economy , public economics , economics , psychology , law , computer science , mechanical engineering , linguistics , philosophy , machine learning , engineering , psychiatry

A theoretical model and two experiments in the Philippines show that information about the mere existence of government programs influences both voter and candidate behavior. Theory predicts that incumbents shirk when voters are unaware of programs. Consistent with this, in the survey experiment, information indicating the availability of municipal development funds significantly reduces support for incumbent mayors. The field experiment distributed similar information to voters prior to municipal elections, with the full knowledge of candidates. Incumbent mayors increased vote buying in treatment areas to counteract the decrease in voter support. Effects were strongest in villages with fewer incumbent-provided public goods. JEL Code: D, P

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