Economic Incentives for Antibacterial Drug Development: Literature Review and Considerations From the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance: Table 1. | Zendy

Kimberly Sciarretta | Zendy; JohnArne Røttingen | Zendy; Aleksandra Opalska | Zendy; Arjon J. van Hengel | Zendy; Joseph C. Larsen | Zendy

Open Access

Economic Incentives for Antibacterial Drug Development: Literature Review and Considerations From the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance: Table 1.

Author(s) -

Kimberly Sciarretta,

JohnArne Røttingen,

Aleksandra Opalska,

Arjon J. van Hengel,

Joseph C. Larsen

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

clinical infectious diseases

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 3.44

H-Index - 336

eISSN - 1537-6591

pISSN - 1058-4838

DOI - 10.1093/cid/ciw593

Subject(s) - incentive , antibiotic resistance , medicine , government (linguistics) , task (project management) , public economics , resistance (ecology) , drug development , linkage (software) , antimicrobial drug , antimicrobial , risk analysis (engineering) , microbiology and biotechnology , industrial organization , intensive care medicine , marketing , business , economics , drug , antibiotics , pharmacology , market economy , management , biology , philosophy , gene , ecology , linguistics , biochemistry

The Trans-Atlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) in 2015 was tasked with exploring economic incentives for antibacterial drug development and providing recommendations for potential global implementation. Due to the continual decline of pharmaceutical companies investing in new antibiotic development and the rise in antimicrobial resistance, there is an urgent need to examine market mechanisms that are appropriate to encourage small, medium, and large companies to reinvest in this space. This review provides a summary of the various models that have been proposed and highlights positions posed by several policy documents, peer-reviewed publications, organization proposals, and government-sponsored reviews. The findings support a form of a de-linkage model and a combination of push and pull incentive mechanisms. This level of consensus could culminate in global coordination of incentives that strike a balance of rewarding innovation and ensuring appropriate antibiotic use.

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