Reply to Crupi et al.'s ‘Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’ ([2008])

Crupi et al. ([2008]) propose a generalization ofBayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time to, ... , ti, ... , tn such that the agent's subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pro(E) at to to ... to PriCE) at ti to ... to Prn(E) at tn . It is understood that the agent's subjective pro babilities change for E and no logically stronger proposition, and that the agent updates her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization. For this specific scenario the authors propose to take the difference between Pro(H) and Pri(H) as the degree to which E confirms H for the agent at time ti (relative to time to), Co.i(H, E). This proposal is claimed to be adequate, because