Is act-consequentialism self-effacing?
Author(s) -
Nikhil Venkatesh
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.452
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-8284
pISSN - 0003-2638
DOI - 10.1093/analys/anab042
Subject(s) - consequentialism , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , epistemology , outcome (game theory) , psychology , mathematical economics , economics , biology , biochemistry
Act-consequentialism (C) is self-effacing for an agent iff that agent’s not accepting C would produce the best outcome. The question of whether C is self-effacing is important for evaluating C. Some hold that if C is self-effacing that would be a mark against it (Williams 1973: 134); however, the claim that C is self-effacing is also used to defend C against certain objections (Parfit 1984: Ch. 1, Railton 1984). In this paper I will show that one argument suggested by Parfit and Railton fails to establish that C is self-effacing for individuals. However, a slightly different argument may show that C is self-effacing for groups. This raises the intriguing possibility that it might be right for an individual, but not for a group of which they are a member, to accept a moral theory. This possibility, odd though it seems, might be helpful to consequentialists.
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