Straight to the point: Experiential punctivism and the perception of time
Author(s) -
Henry Pollock
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.452
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-8284
pISSN - 0003-2638
DOI - 10.1093/analys/anab009
Subject(s) - experiential learning , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , metaphysics , perception , object (grammar) , phenomenon , philosophy , point (geometry) , psychology , mathematics , linguistics , mathematics education , biochemistry , chemistry , geometry
The aim of this paper is to show that the A-theorist's argument from experience is undermined by a commitment to ‘experiential punctivism' - the view that instantaneous (or near-instantaneous) experiences are metaphysically prior to durative ones. The experiences to which the A-theorist's argument appeals are those of processual events. For these experiences to constitute perceptions of temporal passage it would be necessary to perceive such processes qua processes; but, if experiential punctivism were true, this would be impossible. We could only ever perceive those processes qua temporal variation, which merely amounts to an awareness of change as described by the B-theory. If there is such a phenomenon as the passing of time, it could not be an object of our experience.
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