Innovative Negligence Rules | Zendy

Giuseppe DariMattiacci | Zendy; Luigi Alberto Franzoni | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Innovative Negligence Rules

Author(s) -

Giuseppe DariMattiacci,

Luigi Alberto Franzoni

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

american law and economics review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.907

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1465-7260

pISSN - 1465-7252

DOI - 10.1093/aler/aht021

Subject(s) - harm , verifiable secret sharing , order (exchange) , risk analysis (engineering) , actuarial science , business , computer security , law and economics , economics , microeconomics , computer science , psychology , finance , social psychology , set (abstract data type) , programming language

Often, injurers or victims (or both) can adopt a new technology that reduces the social costs of accidents. When adoption costs are not verifiable in court, optimal adoption decisions cannot be induced by means of an appropriate determination of negligence. Hence the parties might either over- or under-adopt. We study how due-care standards should be conditioned on the technology adopted by the parties in order to improve adoption decisions. We demonstrate that standards should be biased upwards or downwards, depending on whether the new technology reduces or increases expected harm

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research