An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law
Author(s) -
E. A. Posner,
Alan O. Sykes
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
american law and economics review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.907
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1465-7260
pISSN - 1465-7252
DOI - 10.1093/aler/ahm001
Subject(s) - state responsibility , international law , liability , law , state (computer science) , business , political science , strict liability , municipal law , private law , legal liability , control (management) , public law , law and economics , economics , computer science , management , algorithm
The international law of state responsibility determines when states are liable for international law violations. States are generally liable when they have control over the actions of wrongdoers; thus, the actions of state officials can implicate state responsibility whereas the acts of private citizens usually do not. We argue that the rules of state responsibility have an economic logic similar to that of vicarious liability in domestic law: the law in both cases provides third parties with incentives to control the behavior of wrongdoers whom they can monitor and influence. We also discuss international legal remedies and individual liability under international criminal law. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom