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Prevention of the Development or Use of Biological Weapons
Author(s) -
Gigi Kwik Grönvall
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
health security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.705
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 2326-5108
pISSN - 2326-5094
DOI - 10.1089/hs.2016.0096
Subject(s) - biological warfare , engineering , environmental planning , business , computer security , computer science , environmental science , biology , toxicology
P reventing the development and use of biological weapons should continue to be a top priority for the nation. There are fundamental issues that make prevention difficult, however. The knowledge, materials, and technologies needed to make and use a biological weapon are readily accessible around the world. Pathogens are ubiquitous in nature and can be found in hospital and research laboratories, scientific culture collections, and in sick people and animals everywhere. It is now possible to synthesize pathogens from scratch, particularly viruses, with technologies that are inexpensive and globally available. The skills and equipment for making a biological weapon are largely the same as those required for progress in medicine, agriculture, and other fields and are required for future economic prosperity for the nation, so they cannot be locked away. Efforts that might be useful in deterring terrorist groups will be different than those targeted toward nation states—and every nation state is presumed to have the technical and financial resources to have a biological weapons program should they choose to embark on one. In spite of these challenges, the US government has options for increasing the likelihood that biological attacks can be prevented, through maintaining international norms and improving surveillance systems, deterring potential adversaries by demonstrating a strong national response, developing better forensic analysis, generating better intelligence, and implementing sensible security practices for legitimate scientists. Recommendations ‚ The US government should continue to strongly support the Biological Weapons Convention and other international efforts that both prevent terrorism and promote the development of a global public health infrastructure. The cornerstone of biological nonproliferation strategies is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC is the first agreement among nations that declared an entire category of weapons to be off limits. The moral force of the treaty has not prevented all of its signatories from developing biological weapons: For example, the Soviet Union, a signatory to the convention, established an enormous secret bioweapons program during the Cold War, and there are some current signatories that are highly likely to have offensive biological weapons programs. However , no country openly goes against the international norm to display an offensive biological weapons capability. This prohibition against biological weapons development should continue to be strengthened with vigorous US support to promote universal …

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