Technology and Time Inconsistency
Author(s) -
Bård Harstad
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 21.034
H-Index - 186
eISSN - 1537-534X
pISSN - 0022-3808
DOI - 10.1086/707024
Subject(s) - externality , subsidy , economics , upstream (networking) , maturity (psychological) , microeconomics , dynamic inconsistency , investment (military) , sustainability , industrial organization , market economy , psychology , computer network , developmental psychology , ecology , politics , computer science , political science , law , biology
Policy makers have time-inconsistent preferences if they fear losing power or are endowed with hyperbolic discount factors. Politicians may thus seek to influence future policy choices, for example, by investing in green technologies that motivate later politicians to act sustainably. I show that optimal investment subsidies are larger for technologies that are strategic complements to future investments, that are further upstream in the supply chain, or that are characterized by longer maturity. Time inconsistency can rationalize subsidies at similar levels as market failures such as externalities can. Furthermore, the two are superadditive: time inconsistency and strategic investments are especially important for long-term policies associated with externalities.
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