Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules | Zendy

Jon X. Eguia | Zendy; Kenneth A. Shepsle | Zendy

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Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules

Author(s) -

Jon X. Eguia,

Kenneth A. Shepsle

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

the journal of politics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 3.489

H-Index - 121

eISSN - 1468-2508

pISSN - 0022-3816

DOI - 10.1086/682389

Subject(s) - legislator , legislature , bargaining power , negotiation , law and economics , economics , business , microeconomics , public economics , political science , public administration , law , legislation

We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in the assembly. We predict that the agenda protocol chosen in equilibrium disproportionately favors more senior legislators, granting them greater opportunities to make policy proposals, and it generates an incumbency advantage to all legislators.

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