Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools | Zendy

Jere R. Behrman | Zendy; Susan W. Parker | Zendy; Petra Todd | Zendy; Kenneth I. Wolpin | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools

Author(s) -

Jere R. Behrman,

Susan W. Parker,

Petra Todd,

Kenneth I. Wolpin

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

journal of political economy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 21.034

H-Index - 186

eISSN - 1537-534X

pISSN - 0022-3808

DOI - 10.1086/675910

Subject(s) - incentive , treatment and control groups , curriculum , randomized experiment , mathematics education , psychology , control (management) , medical education , pedagogy , economics , medicine , mathematics , statistics , microeconomics , management

This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentive schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment 1 provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment 2 to teachers only, and treatment 3 gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment 3, smaller impacts for treatment 1, and no impact for treatment 2

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research