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The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining
Author(s) -
Richard T. Boylan
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the journal of law and economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.42
H-Index - 81
eISSN - 1537-5285
pISSN - 0022-2186
DOI - 10.1086/663588
Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , plea , suspect , prison , selection (genetic algorithm) , psychology , sample (material) , economics , criminology , actuarial science , social psychology , law , political science , computer science , chemistry , chromatography , artificial intelligence
This study examines whether criminal suspects facing more severe punishmentsare more likely to go to trial. Sample selection makes it difficult to obtain validproxies for severity; for instance, I expect severity to be positively related to theprosecutors decision to indict, to indict in federal court (versus state court),and to try the suspect. Theoretical and empirical findings indicate that in samplescontaining only indicted, convicted, or tried suspects, reasonable proxies forseverity may be negatively related to actual severity. The assignment of defendantsto judges randomizes the severity of punishment in a manner that isunrelated to sample selection. Thus, by examining the effect of these assignments,I find that a 10-month increase in prison sentences raises trial rates by1 percentage point

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