Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?
Author(s) -
Nancy Gallini,
Suzanne Scotchmer
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
innovation policy and the economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.895
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1537-2618
pISSN - 1531-3468
DOI - 10.1086/653754
Subject(s) - intellectual property , incentive , law and economics , ideal (ethics) , intangible property , business , property (philosophy) , economics , industrial organization , law , microeconomics , political science , philosophy , epistemology
Intellectual property is not the only mechanism used in the American economy for rewarding R&D. Prizes and contract research of various types are also common. Given the current controversies that swirl around intellectual property policies, we review the economic reasoning that supports patent and other intellectual property over the alternatives. For those economic environments where intellectual property is justified, we review some of the arguments for why it is designed as it is. We focus particularly on the issue of how broad awards should be and how much protection should go to the original inventor (as opposed to those who subsequently improve the invention). We emphasize that the ideal design of an intellectual property system depends on the ease with which rightsholders can enter into licensing and other contractual arrangements involving these rights.
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