Settlement of Litigation under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis
Author(s) -
Tai-Yeong Chung
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
the journal of legal studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.251
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1537-5366
pISSN - 0047-2530
DOI - 10.1086/467978
Subject(s) - plaintiff , settlement (finance) , human settlement , federal rules of civil procedure , civil procedure , american rule , rule of reason , law , rule of law , law and economics , economics , economic analysis , political science , business , supreme court , engineering , finance , payment , politics , agricultural economics , waste management
Rule 68 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff who refuses a defendant's formal settlement offer and then obtains a judgment not more favorable than the offer must pay the defendant's postoffer costs. An economic analysis is provided (i) to argue that the standard definition of settlement range is not adequate for analyzing Rule 68 because it contains unreasonable, dominated offers, (ii) to present a new definition of the refined settlement range that is adequate for analyzing the effects of Rule 68, and (iii) to propose a revision of Rule 68 to encourage settlements of litigation.
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