Government Concession Contracts in Chile: The Role of Competition in the Bidding Process | Zendy

Ricardo Paredes | Zendy; José Miguel Sánchez | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Government Concession Contracts in Chile: The Role of Competition in the Bidding Process

Author(s) -

Ricardo Paredes,

José Miguel Sánchez

Publication year - 2004

Publication title -

economic development and cultural change

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.217

H-Index - 71

eISSN - 1539-2988

pISSN - 0013-0079

DOI - 10.1086/423259

Subject(s) - bidding , competition (biology) , incentive , government (linguistics) , business , private capital , process (computing) , welfare , private sector , industrial organization , finance , economics , public economics , market economy , microeconomics , marketing , economic growth , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , production (economics) , computer science , biology , operating system

Over the last 12 years, Chile has been very successful in attracting private participation in the provision of public infrastructure. Private capital has gone into road infrastructure, ports, and airports all over the country in the form of concessions. The aim of the 1991 Concession Law and that of the specific contracts associated with each project has been to provide much‐needed infrastructure efficiently, without committing government resources better employed elsewhere. Using the contracts of four infrastructure projects involving the private sector in Chile, we show that, even though these projects and the concessions program are positively evaluated, design flaws in the auction setup directly or indirectly reduced competition in the bidding process, negatively affected performance, created incentives for ex post renegotiation, and precluded welfare maximization.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research