Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts | Zendy

Wallace E. Huffman | Zendy; Richard E. Just | Zendy

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Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts

Author(s) -

Wallace E. Huffman,

Richard E. Just

Publication year - 2004

Publication title -

economic development and cultural change

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.217

H-Index - 71

eISSN - 1539-2988

pISSN - 0013-0079

DOI - 10.1086/420685

Subject(s) - land tenure , agency (philosophy) , download , state (computer science) , political science , agrarian society , corporation , huffman coding , economics , agriculture , agricultural economics , economic history , sociology , history , law , social science , archaeology , algorithm , computer science , operating system , coding (social sciences)

Explores landowner-tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture. Inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation; Introduction of principal-agent models; Influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner-tenant risk sharing; Need to study adequate tenant incentives

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