The Logic of Sanctioning Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Assessment | Zendy

Yeheskel Hasenfeld | Zendy; Toorjo Ghose | Zendy; Kandyce Larson | Zendy

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The Logic of Sanctioning Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Assessment

Author(s) -

Yeheskel Hasenfeld,

Toorjo Ghose,

Kandyce Larson

Publication year - 2004

Publication title -

social service review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.73

H-Index - 58

eISSN - 1537-5404

pISSN - 0037-7961

DOI - 10.1086/382771

Subject(s) - sanctions , welfare , legislation , work (physics) , public economics , welfare reform , compliance (psychology) , empirical research , actuarial science , economics , business , political science , psychology , social psychology , law , engineering , philosophy , epistemology , mechanical engineering

The 1996 welfare reform legislation expanded the use of sanctions under the assumption that welfare recipients can comply with work requirements and that they can calculate the costs and benefits of compliance. This research tests the validity of these assumptions through a record‐ and survey‐based study of California welfare recipients. The article questions the validity of the assumptions, finding that, compared to nonsanctioned recipients, sanctioned recipients face greater barriers to meeting the work requirements. A significant proportion say that they were not informed about the sanctioning rules. Almost half of sanctioned recipients were not aware that they were sanctioned.

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