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Walras Retrouvé: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price
Author(s) -
Gianni De Fraja,
József Sákovics
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 21.034
H-Index - 186
eISSN - 1537-534X
pISSN - 0022-3808
DOI - 10.1086/322087
Subject(s) - economics , matching (statistics) , outcome (game theory) , microeconomics , general equilibrium theory , competitive equilibrium , contrast (vision) , computer science , statistics , mathematics , artificial intelligence
We extend the standard analysis of decentralized markets to allow for the possibility that traders interact simultaneously with more than one trader on the opposite side of the market. In contrast with the liter- ature, we reconcile the Walrasian equilibrium with the outcome of decentralized strategic trade: we show that there exist generic match- ing technologies that determine local market conditions such that, as market frictions vanish, the equilibrium price is the one that would result in the static Walrasian market. Our analysis highlights the im- portance of local market conditions for the determination of equilib- rium prices.

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