Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A Forced Marriage?

There are many points in John Roemer's paper which I would like to discuss. Since I am in general agreement with his criticisms of bargaining theory as an approach to distributive justice, I will focus on the question of equality of welfare versus equality of resources and the striking theorem which Roemer states in the fourth section of his paper. This theorem purports to show that, insofar as it claims to differ from equality of welfare, the idea of equality of resources is incoherent: there are elements within this idea itself which lead inexorably to the conclusion that any acceptable allocation mechanism must be welfare equalizing. In addition, Roemer suggests that his axioms render "the distinction between preferences and resources extremely hazy" (p. 107) and "force upon us a reductionst, determinist program" (p. 109). Roemer's conclusion is not that we must advocate equality of welfare but, rather, that adequate principles of distributive justice must move beyond "economic environments" and be sensitive to the "names" of goods: they must take into account which goods are being distributed, not merely the level of utility (preference satisfaction) that is produced. I agree with this conclusion, and I imagine that any defender of equality of resources would have agreed from the outset. This leads me to look back at Roemer's axioms with a more critical eye. In what follows I will argue, first, that the axioms which Roemer puts forward as a characterization of resource egalitarianism in fact include principles which only a welfarist would accept. Second, I will argue that the welfarism which these axioms require is not as extreme as Roemer suggests: they do not "force upon us a reductionist, determinist program" unless all forms of welfarism do so. Finally, in the concluding sections of the paper, I will consider some problems which Roemer's discussion raises for resourcism and discuss the issue of "ideal" versus "second-best" theory.