Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists | Zendy

Alvin E. Roth | Zendy; Xiaolin Xing | Zendy

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Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists

Author(s) -

Alvin E. Roth,

Xiaolin Xing

Publication year - 1997

Publication title -

journal of political economy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 21.034

H-Index - 186

eISSN - 1537-534X

pISSN - 0022-3808

DOI - 10.1086/262074

Subject(s) - interim , incentive , context (archaeology) , order (exchange) , matching (statistics) , clearing , position (finance) , business , industrial organization , microeconomics , economics , finance , paleontology , statistics , mathematics , archaeology , biology , history

The potential transactions evaluated in labor markets before equilibrium is identified involve rejected offers. After an initial phase in which many offers can be made simultaneously, a new offer cannot be made until an outstanding offer is rejected, so even a small time required to process offers and rejections may cause bottlenecks. In many labor markets, this means that transactions have to be finalized before the market clears. A firm needs to consider the likelihood that its offer will be accepted, since if its offer is rejected other potential employees may become unavailable in the interim. The analysis is carried out in connection with the market for clinical psychologists. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

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